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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000954

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DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
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SUBJECT: KOENIGS AND BOUCHER ON INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION,
PAKISTAN, AND IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY

11. (C) A special response fund to allow the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan close developmental cooperation with ISAF would advance civilian-military coordination; Washington support requested. Additionally, in a March 14 meeting with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and the Ambassador, Tom Koenigs (the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan) asked for U.S. support in soliciting international staff from donor governments to strengthen the Secretariat of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. Boucher urged caution in dealing with Iran and pressed Koenigs not to raise the issue of Pakistan's role in security in Afghanistan at the UN Security Council meeting on March 20. End summary.

KOENIGS REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR THE JOINT COORDINATION
AND MONITORING BOARD SECRETARIAT

12. (C) As co-chair of the Afghanistan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, Koenigs noted a continuing need to strengthen the Board secretariat and get donor governments to participate more actively in the Board's decision-making processes. The Board's secretariat remains weak due to a lack of capacity

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among its current employees, and Koenigs asked for U.S. help in soliciting donor governments to identify 4-5 employees (ideally Persian/Dari-speaking expatriates) who could serve on the Board's secretariat. Boucher agreed to assist. To better harmonize their efforts and keep abreast of developments, Koenigs also mentioned that Western capitals should push

their representatives in Kabul to make more use of the existing coordination structures. For example, he would like to see more European countries participating actively in the Afghan National Development Strategy working and consultative groups that report to the Board. In his view, only the U.S. was effectively using these structures, including the Ambassadors' Tea Club consultative meetings, to raise issues requiring more focused attention.

COORDINATING DONOR SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN REACH OF
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

13. (C) A second challenge involved the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's interest in strengthening integration of military and civilian assistance efforts, particularly at the local and provincial levels where coordination is often lacking. Koenigs thought part of the answer to this could come from the recent doubling of the UN's presence from 8 to 15 offices in the provinces. At the provincial level, Koenigs also lamented the lack of a shared vision among donor countries administering Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He specifically noted the UK and the Netherlands are singularly focused on Helmand and Uruzgan (respectively) and have little interest in the greater picture. Koenigs noted that London in particular has weakened its Ambassador by communicating directly with its representatives in Helmand, leaving its Ambassador in Kabul out of the loop. According to Koenigs, not all Provincial Reconstruction Teams "get the message" that they should be an extension of the central government to the people of Afghanistan, instead allowing themselves to be seen as individual

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countries assisting the Afghan people where their own government cannot. Koenigs pledged to push this message during his upcoming travel to Western capitals and suggested an independent assessment of the impact of the Provincial Teams. Boucher agreed and suggested that the UN's take on the role of assessing "best practices" among the Teams.

14. (SBU) Koenigs noted that several donor countries have not supplied adequate input to the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) administered through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. He noted that this national database should include both governmental and military aid coming from donors. While USAID has been feeding input into the Donor Assistance Database, Koenigs noted that U.S. military sources of aid have not been included.

15. (C) Koenigs also highlighted the inability of donors other than the U.S. to provide quick intervention assistance to affected areas in the wake of military operations. One possibility would be for the international community to create some sort of "international quick response fund" for these areas hit by military operations against the Taliban. This could take the form of a stand-alone entity or possibly be housed within the World Bank managed Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Boucher agreed to look into pushing other NATO members to consider a new international mechanism for quick intervention. Koenigs noted that such funding could be tied to the Policy Action Group (PAG) process, which focuses on security and development in four provinces along Afghanistan's southeastern border with Pakistan.

BOUCHER URGES CAUTION IN SEEKING GREATER IRANIAN

¶6. (C) Koenigs also mentioned his plans to lobby Tehran to coordinate its assistance to Afghanistan through the central government. On security, Koenigs shared his belief that Iran has been more supportive of the Northern Alliance - specifically a newly formed political group called the National United Front (septel) - than of the central government. "They are not siding with the Taliban," noted Koenigs, "but they are not fighting them either." Boucher urged Koenigs to be cautious in dealing with Iran, as Iran has begun to support factions in Kabul, individuals in the provinces, and "adopting Herat." Koenigs agreed that Iran is not only helping the Hazaras, but also the National United Front, a new political group rumored to be positioning itself as a political alternative to President Karzai. He also noted that the Taliban had grown noticeably careful in its rhetoric about the Hazara community, likely out of fear of the Hazara community's increasing links to Iran.

BOUCHER URGES KOENIGS NOT TO RAISE PAKISTAN-
AFGHANISTAN ISSUE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL

¶7. (C) When Koenigs expressed a desire to raise the issue of Pakistan's role in security in Afghanistan at the March 21 UN Security Council meeting, Assistant Secretary Boucher bluntly told Koenigs not to

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push for an open discussion of Pakistan's role in Afghan security, as it would make it harder to get cooperation from Pakistan and disrupt the current momentum achieved over the past several months.

¶8. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher's office cleared this

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